Welcome 2013 Arizona Statewide Exercise Critical Infrastructure Seminar

January 31, 2013

Welcome

Lou Trammell Director of the Arizona Division of Emergency Management

Administrative

- Emergency Exits
 - Marshaling Areas (north / south)
- Restrooms
- Cafeteria
- Cell Phones
- Smoking Area
- Sign in sheets / correct email addresses

Agenda

- Welcome
- 2013 Arizona Statewide Exercise Scenario Overview
 - Jan Lindner, Arizona Division of Emergency Management
- Power Grids
 - Kendra Cea, Arizona Public Service
- AZWARN
 - Steve Shepard, Metro Water
- Kinder Morgan Pipeline
 - Scott Manley, Kinder Morgan
- Logistical Capabilities Assessment Tool
 - Matt Parks, Arizona Division of Emergency Management
- Intro to Arizona Catastrophic Plan
 - Robert Clyburn, FEMA Region IX

Exercise Overview

Exercise Dates

- The 2013 Arizona SWE will be a two day event
- Nov. 6th is the Functional (FE) / Full Scale (FSE)
 component of the exercise and will be held during standard
 business hours
- Nov. 7th will be a 8 hr Tabletop Exercise
- The scenario will be a continuation of the FE/FSE
- There will be a time jump to week 2 of the power outage
- The forum will be a plenary session with breakout groups and then a moderated discussion
- The breakout groups will integrate Critical Sectors, with ESF's and other like organizations

Exercise Dates

- The 2013 Arizona SWE Recovery component will be exercised Nov. 20-21, 2013
- The Recovery exercise will be based upon the outcomes from Nov. 6-7

Power Outage Scenario

PURPOSE

The purpose of the 2013 Arizona SWE is to provide participants with an opportunity to evaluate their current plans, procedures and capabilities for a response to random or complete loss of power for an extended period of time

Power Outage Scenario

- The scenario is being designed to provide for an ultimate stress to all statewide systems and infrastructure
- The artificiality of the exercise will be simulating the month of July 2013. This time of year can put more stress on the electrical grid.
- Severe monsoons storms have moved into Arizona causing lightning strikes and creating Wildland Fires
- These events will then drive power outage and cascading effects throughout the state

Impact to Infrastructure

- Electricity
- Water
- Trash and Sewer
- Natural Gas
- Gasoline
- Transportation
- Health and Safety (to include 1st Responders
- Pharmacies
 - Pharmaceuticals
- Hospitals /Hospital Supplies
- Manufacturing


- Communications
 - Internet
 - Emergency Services
 - Utility Industry
 Communications
 - Public and Private Sector Communications
- Banking
- Grocery Stores
- Retail Stores
- Nitrogen Gaseous Pipeline
- Gas and Chemicals
- Postal and Shipping



Keeping the Lights On Seasonal & Emergency Preparedness

January 31, 2013
2013 Statewide Exercise Critical Infrastructure Seminar
Presented by Kendra Cea, APS

Electric Grid




Electric Grid (cont)

- Western Interconnection operates as one big machine
- All reliability entities must operate their system to maintain the reliability of the machine
- Failure to do so can result in cascading outages
- Significant economic impacts to State of AZ if cascading outage occurs




The Arizona Electric "Grid"




APS Service Area

- ▶ 11 counties
- **35,000** square miles
- ▶ 1.1 million customers
- > 32 customers/sq. mi.
- > 29,000 distribution line miles
- > 5,000 transmission line miles
- ▶ 54 generation units




SRP's Electric Service Area


The Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District provides electricity to 950,000 power users in a 2,900 square-mile service area in parts of three counties -- Maricopa, Gila and Pinal



APS System Peak Loads




APS/SRP Maximum Load Serving Capability Metro Phoenix Area



Yuma Area Maximum Load Serving Capability

MW




Curtailment Planning

Should a Bulk Power Supply Emergency, Transmission Emergency or a Fuel Shortage seem imminent, the following steps shall be implemented as appropriate:

- Reschedule maintenance
- Coordinate with other utilities
- Utilize stand-by generation units
- Reduce system voltage
- Invoke emergency & short-term contracts
- Seek voluntary conservation
- If insufficient resources are available rotating outages of 30-60 minutes in duration

Southwest Natural Gas Pipelines



Planning & Coordination are Critical

- Equipment failure & related incidents
- Wildfires threaten electric facilities
- Weather related outages, such as monsoon storms







2008 Labor Day Storms – APS statistics

- Storms resulted in outages impacting approximately 90,000 customers
- APS Call Center handled 47,609 customer calls on August 29th alone – a single day record
- Over 2600 trouble orders were generated and needed to be responded to
- 138 locations where line crews were required to restore service









Substation Fires

Westwing 500kV Transformers



Ownership

APS - 28.5%

SRP - 44.2%

WAPA - 27.3%

July 4, 2004 at 6:59 pm

Fire at Westwing Substation in 500/230kV transformer.

Five APS 500/230kV transformers damaged and/or destroyed.



Westwing Fire Statistics

Before the Westwing Fire

- Metro Phoenix area capacity 11,800 MW
- Projected summer load–10,300 MW
- Metro Phoenix area load 8,000+ MW

Immediately After the Fire

- Metro Phoenix area capacity 8,300 MW
- Metro Phoenix area load 8,000+ MW

Within a few days of the Fire

- Metro Phoenix area capacity 9,300 MW
- Metro Phoenix area load 8,900+ MW

Approx One month later on August 9th

- Metro Phoenix area capacity 10,800 MW
- Metro Phoenix area load–8,900 to 9,200 MW

Westwing Statistics, con't

Incident Response

- No customers were interrupted
- Increased use of Metro Phoenix area
- APS & SRP implemented voluntary conservation plan
- Worked around the clock to repair overhead structures, cabling and control wiring
- Transformer bank restored by July 8th
- Coordination with Emergency Management officials and Central Arizona Life Safety System Response Council







State Wide Operations Coordination

- Procedures developed by APS/SRP/TEP/WAPA
- Starting May 15thof each year -each Monday, or more often -as needed
- APS/SRP/TEP/WAPA coordinated Operations Conference Call
- Wild fire Command Center participation

Emergency Preparedness

- Business Continuity Plans updated and exercised
- Incident Command Training for management & utility first responders
- Emergency Operations Training
- General business planning
 - Curtailment Plan annual filing
 - ECC Disaster Recovery Planning
 - Essential Resources tested to meet Regulatory Requirements
 - Public / Private Partnerships

Emergency Equipment

- Mobile Substations/Transformers
- Emergency Towers
- Mobile Command Centers
- Generators



Residential Customer Outreach

- Coordination with Emergency Management and local/government public safety officials
- Dry ice and/or bagged "wet" ice for customers experiencing extended outages
- ► Emergency shelters, often "cooling" shelters managed by emergency mgmt professionals
- Medical Monitoring for life support customers



We Are Well Prepared!

- Generation resources are in place to meet customer load and reserve requirements
- Transmission capacity in place to import remote generation and purchases
- Distribution infrastructure improvements on schedule to meet customer needs

Plans in-place to respond to extreme conditions



Steve Shepard AzWARN Chair

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(520) 209-2838

DISCUSSION

- What is WARN
- Benefits of a WARN Program
- Why Mutual Aid for Water and Wastewater
- National WARN
- AzWARN Milestones and Status

What is WARN?


- Water / Wastewater Agency Response Network
- Not a Corporation or a Governmental Unit
- Participation and Response are Voluntary
- Utilities Organized within a State by Mutual Aid Agreements
- Network of Utilities Helping Utilities
- United by a Common Goal
- Share Common Issues
 - Natural Disasters
 - Human Caused Disaster
 - System Failures
 - Unexpected



Benefits of WARN

- Rapid Assistance
- Similar Knowledge Base
- Access to Specialized Resources
 EPA Emergency Response Lab Network
- Certified Personnel
- Similar Equipment
- Common Materials
- Establishes Emergency Contacts
- Training, Exercises, Networking
- Procedures Established in Advance

Rapid Response



Florida Rapid Assistance (Florida WARN Provides Assistance in Mississippi mobilized in 3 days)





Challenges of Restoring Service



Specialized Operations

systems and instrumentation









WATER & WASTEWATER MUTUAL AID & ASSISTANCE RESOURCE TYPING MANUAL

April 2008



RESOURCE: WASTEWATER LIFT AND PUMP STATIONS DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, REPAIR AND START-UP TEAM AWWA April 2008 Category: Public Works and Engineering (ESF 3) Subcategory: Water and Wastewater Kind: _X_ Team								
Capability	Degree and type of repair and start-up capability	Screw, submersible, wetwell / drywell and vertical-turbine solids-handling pumps greater than 400 HP	Screw, submersible, wetwell / drywell, vertical-turbine solids- handling pumps and suction-lift pumps 26 – 400 HP	Submersible, suction- lift, grinder, LPP, vacuum and STEP pumps, 25 HP or smaller	Components of Type I – III Teams			
Ideal Team Size	Total persons	4	4	2	1-2			
Team Composition	Team member capabilities for assessments and repairs indicated	1 Qualified mechanic 1 Qualified electrician 2 Repair technicians (mechanic or electrician serves as team leader)	1 Qualified mechanic 1 Qualified electrician 2 Repair technicians (mechanic or electrician serves as team leader)	1 Qualified mechanic 1 Qualified electrician 2 Repair technicians (mechanic or electrician serves as team leader)	Any portion of other types that can be provided			
Vehicles and Heavy Equipment	Number and type of vehicles and heavy equipment	1 or 2 Heavy-duty 4X4 pick-up trucks or equivalent, one with equipment boom 1 30-ton+ crane preferred	1 or 2 Heavy-duty 4X4 pick-up trucks or equivalent, one with equipment boom	1 or 2 Heavy-duty 4X4 pick-up trucks or equivalent, one with equipment boom	Any portion of other types that can be provided			
Other Equipment	Other specific equipment	Necessary tools and equipment	Necessary tools and equipment	Necessary tools and equipment	Any portion of other types that can be provided			
Materials	As needed for repairs indicated	Necessary materials as indicated	Necessary materials as indicated	Necessary materials as indicated	NA			

Comments and Definitions: This team is responsible for the assessment and repair of all types of wastewater lift station and pump facilities, regardless of size, including conveyance facilities, treatment plants and pump stations, excluding structural and similar scale repairs. Requestor should specify types of pump facilities in need of assessment and repair in which expertise is needed, as well as any materials that should be provided by the responder. Major materials provided by requestor or others.

Specific types of pump facilities in need of asse					
Specific materials that should be provided by responders:					
Specific control systems used: Electronic	Pneumatic	Hydraulic	Facility capacity (MGD):		
Maximum pump voltages: 4160 480					

NETWORKING NETWORKING NETWORKING

Arizona Utilities

Arizona Emergency Response Agencies (local and state)

Water Sector Stakeholders

Out of State Utilities

EPA

Interstate Training and Exercises

Why Mutual Aid?

- Fires?
- Floods?
- Earthquakes?
- System Failures?
- Unexpected?



Source: Wikimedia

Fires



No Date

Aspen Fire, Tucson, 2003

areas in the Southwest

Arizona wild land fires making "most serious in U.S. History" List					
Year	Name	Acres	Description		
June 1990	Dude Fire	24,174	6 lives lost, 63 homes destroyed		
June 2002	Rodeo- Chediski	462,00 0	426 structures destroyed		
June 2005	Cave Creek Complex	248,31 0	11 structures destroyed		


Floods Happen

Widespread, Damaging Floods in AZ 1978, 1983, 1993, 2006

Pima County 1092

Pima County 1983 Flood/Erosion Damage

Portion of Maricopa County FEMA Map






File photo, PCDOT

Sabino Canyon Flood, Tucson July 29, 2006



Earthquakes



Security Concerns



Terror From the Right
Almost 60 terrorist
plots uncovered in the
U.S.

National Guard troops set to begin border work

Members will extend fences, improve lighting in busy Arizona area



Associated Press

Updated: 5:82 a.m. MT June 5, 2006

YUMA, Ariz. – The first National Guard troops sent to assist immigration agents prepared Sunday to work on projects near a fortified stretch of desert along the U.S.-Mexico border.

The 55 Utah National Guard members on Monday plan to begin extending fences, improving gravel roads and working on border lighting near the town of San Luis, Aria., which is part of the nation's busiest U.S. Border Patrol station.

"They are putting everything together so they can hit the ground running," said Maj. Hank McIntire, a spokesman for the Utah National Guard.

Story continues below 1

advertisement



Launch


Guard troops arrive

June 5: The frist National Guard troops arrive on the U.S./Mexico border as part of the Bush administration's attempt to enhance border security. NBC's George Lewis reports from Arizona.

Today show



Unexpected Hazards



System Failures



UNEXPECTED



Endorsing WARN?



NATIONAL WARN

- Started in California Early 1990's
 - 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake
 - 1990 Freeze
 - 1991 East Bay Hills Firestorm
- Past Disasters and Lessons Learned
- Federal Agencies Promote WARN

Water Sector National Organizations Endorsing WARN

- Joint Policy Statement
 - 8 Major WaterOrganizations
 - Encourages The Creation Of Intrastate Mutual Aid & Assistance Networks
 - Provides For Greater Water
 Sector Resiliency Against
 Natural Or Human Caused
 Events



Utilities Helping Utilities

Joint Policy Statement on Mutual Aid & Assistance Networks

The water sector is committed to a "Utilities Helping Utilities" concept and is taking steps to encourage utilities and local/state governments to establish intrastate mutual aid and assistance networks. The purpose of these networks is to provide a method whereby water/wastewater utilities that have sustained damages from natural or manmade events could obtain emergency assistance in the form of personnel, equipment, materials, and other associated services as necessary, from other water/wastewater utilities. The objective is to provide rapid, short-term deployment of emergency services to restore the critical operations of the affected water/wastewater utility.

A pre-established agreement among a network of utilities can complement and enhance local capabilities to prepare for and respond to a broad range of threats, both natural and man-made. The establishment of such intrastate mutual aid and assistance networks is a core principle of the National Preparedness Goal developed by the Department of Homeland Security.

Formalizing the existing capability to provide mutual aid and assistance provides the water/wastewater sector with a degree of resiliency against natural or manmade disaster to ensure continuity of service to our sector's customers.


It is essential that all partners in the water and wastewater community work together to support this concept. We encourage our members to discuss this concept with peers and take the steps necessary to establish an intrastate mutual aid and assistance network.

Mutual Aid Joint Policy Statement February 15, 2006


APRIL 2006




MAY 2007




JANUARY 2008




OCTOBER 2008




APRIL 2010



MARCH 2011



"WARN ULTIMATUM"



WARN RESPONSES

- 2005 Hurricane Katrina, Rita, and Wilma FlaWARN
- 2007 Southern California Wildfires (CalWARN)
- 2008 Detroit, Oregon Blizzard (ORWARN)
- 2008 Waterborne Salmonella outbreak, (CoWARN)
- 2008 Hurricane Gustav (LaWARN)
- 2008 Hurricane Ike (TxWARN)
- 2009 Ice Storm (ARWARN, TNWARN, KYWARN)
- 2010 Baja California Earthquake (CalWARN)
- 2011 Hurricane Irene (NCWARN)
- 2012 Foods (MNWARN)
- 2012 Hurricane Sandy

Mutual Aid Agreement

- WARN Mutual Aid Agreement
- The WARN Mutual Aid Agreement is the foundation of the WARN program:
 - Removes obstacles for obtaining assistance
 - Assistance is Voluntary
 - Sets terms and conditions for assistance
 - WARN Structure
 - Requesting Assistance
 - Responding to Requests
 - Reimbursement from Requesting Member
 - Helps with FEMA Reimbursement

AzWARN Members

18 Members

City of Phoenix
City of Peoria
City of Avondale
Prescott Valley
Town of Oro Valley
ADEM

Metro Water District
Pima County
City of Scottsdale
Camp Verde
Town of Buckeye
City of Goodyear

City of Tempe City of Flagstaff City of Tucson Town of Marana City of Glendale Town of Gilbert

AZWARN MILESTONES

Arizona WARN Program – March 2008

AzWARN Website – June 2009

Mutual Aid Legislation Passed – July 2009

Various Table Top Exercises and Trainings

AzWARN By-Laws

AzWARN Operational Plan – November 2011

AzWARN WEBSITE

www.azwarn.org Launched in June of 2009

Public Side of Website

About AzWARN

News and Events

Industry Links

Association and Agency Links

Membership Information

Listing of AzWARN Members

Member Side of Website

Emergency Contact Information of Members

Listing of Member Resources

Ability to Post and Respond to Emergencies

Emergency Email Notifications



Utilities Helping Utilities A Total Control of the Control of the



Pipelines & More

Scott Manley

Operations Manager

There are no refineries in Arizona so all petroleum product must be produced at CA and TX refineries and then trucked in or transported via pipelines.

Gasoline (all grades)
Diesel
Commercial Jet Fuel
Military Grade Jet Fuel



Since the hardest part about building a pipeline is acquiring the right of Easements, Southern Pacific Railroad decided to build on within their already existing easement in 1955.

They also built a communication network in the same easement following the Execunet II decision in 1978 with would free up switchboard use. They laid fiber and one of the big uses was Speedfax lines as well as voice lines. To differentiate between the two they had to come up with a name for the voice...





Which became "Sprint", which is an acronym for Switched PRIvate Network Telecommunications

Atchison, Topeka, Santa Fe Railroad attempted to merge with Southern Pacific Railroad in 1980 and by 1988 was told it was a monopoly in transportation.

Santa Fe kept the pipeline and it was renamed Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines, the railroads were sold off to Rio Grande Industries. For 1.02 Billion.

Later Santa Fe would merge with Burlington Northern Railroad to form Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad (BNSF)

Rich Kinder leaves Enron and with help of college buddy Bill Morgan, they purchase a small liquids pipeline from Enron for \$40 million to form new Company Feb 14, 1997 called Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, a Master Limited Partnership.

October 20th 1997, Kinder Morgan announces it will buy Santa Fe Pacific Pipelines for 1.1 Billion.





2012 Kinder Morgan announces they are to purchase El Paso Natural Gas for \$38 Billion.

This will add an additional 43,000 miles of pipeline and make them the largest midstream company in the World.

Since then they have bought or merged to form a company that consists of 75,000 miles of pipe and 180 terminals that reach across 47 states, Canada, and Mexico with over 9000 employees and an enterprise value of \$100 Billion.




Kinder Morgan Today

- The largest independent transporter of refined petroleum products
- The largest transporter of natural gas in the U.S.
- The largest independent terminal operator
- The largest transporter and marketer of CO2
- The second largest oil producer in Texas
- The only oilsands pipeline serving Vancouver B.C./Washington state
- The Third Largest Energy company in North America


Current Asset Map

KINDERMORGAN




KINDER MORGAN

Arizona Petroleum Pipelines






Pipeline Safety





Smart Pigs (Inline Inspection Tool) MORGAN



Bulk Storage & Loading Facility KINDER MORGAN



Bulk Loading / Delivery to Retail



Retail





Sky Harbor Airport



Luke AFB, Davis-Monthan AFB, Worgan Yuma MCAS, & various Airfields





What happens when the power goes out?

Nothing



Pipeline Safety

Pumps, meters, computers, and all safety devices used for controlling and/or monitoring the pipeline require power; therefore we will not run the pipeline without power.

There is still product on site that can be loaded..right?

Depending on where the product cycle is on each line, you may have 0-3 days reserve on any given product.



Complexity in Phoenix Terminal

- 7 Different Base Gasoline products
- 4 Different Base Diesels
- 2 Different Jet Fuels
- 10 Different Additives
- 28 Different Salable Gasoline blends
- 72 Active Suppliers
 - Each supplier has a long list of customers, drivers, and trucks
- 184 daily reports



Regulatory Oversight

- ExSTARS report to IRS (Excise Summary Terminal Activity Report)
 - How Every gallon came in compared to how every gallon went out. Meter by Meter

VARS

- Every gasoline load that leaves the facility must have the Federal minimum of additive injected.
- (should have the shipper requested amount of additive.)
- If Diesel is not going to be taxed it must red injected with red dye per the IRS.



Regulatory Oversight

- DHS required drivers of hazardous materials have a background check before obtaining endorsement
- Maricopa County requires that all gasoline in "Area A" be the specially formulated CBG gas (Cleaner Burning Gasoline)
- Every Tanker or trailer that loads fuel within Maricopa County must be certified as Vapor tight and have corresponding Vapor Tightness certificate to prove it and that all vapors from the trailer be collected and processed properly.
- Every Tanker and trailer that loads within the Kinder Morgan Title V permitted facility must have proof of insurance and be properly registered.

Safety

- To obtain proper gas to ethanol and additive injection rate, there are several meters and control valves that open and close which are all computer controlled.
 - They default to a closed position.
- To ensure static electricity during the loading process does not cause fire or explosion, a grounding system is attached to the trailer loaded to bond to the loading rack. This system is controlled via computer and gives each pump permissive to turn on.
 - Because EPA requires that diesel contain less than 15 ppm of sulfur, static dissipating additive is injected to diesel loads to compensate for the increase of static.



Safety

- Each trailer is equipped with an overfill switch which prevents overfilling during the loading process.
- Each loading rack that has an automatic Fire Fighting Foam system is required by Phoenix Fire Code to have a working fire foam system unless Fire Dept is notified and approves or is on site during the loading process.
- Each driver is required to have attended a Kinder Morgan Safety Class and have a current CDL with endorsement for hazardous material.

In order to get gas loaded at the bulk facility without meeting any and all regulatory and company policies, you would need written permission from likely several agencies at each of these levels:

- The City of Phoenix
- Maricopa County
- State of Arizona
- Federal

Then Kinder Morgan Management would want a written plan as to how you are going to do it safely.

Provided it was even possible logistically, by the time you obtained this you would likely have power back.



Emergency Vehicles

- If you need to provide emergency vehicles with fuel, then that fuel will need to be obtained from an area with power.
 - Filling of emergency vehicles directly from the bulk facility is not feasible or safe

Supply to General Public

Even if we found a way to get fuel loaded onto trucks, all service stations would be without power.



- Depending on how wide the power outage reached, there are similar Kinder Morgan terminals:
 - Colton CA, 5 hour drive
 - Imperial CA, 4 hour drive
 - Tucson AZ, 2 hour drive
 - El Paso TX, 6 hour drive
- These terminals do not have Maricopa County required fuels.
- There are also smaller non-Kinder Morgan Terminals that may be able to provide emergency relief

My advice,

Protect the Electrical Company assets very, very well!



Questions?





Logistics Capability Assessment Tool (LCAT)


Matthew A. Parks
Assistant Director, Logistics
Arizona Division of Emergency Management

LCAT Overview

- A collaborative logistics planning and preparedness tool
- Participants should include state emergency management officials, FEMA logistics, tribal and local emergency managers, NG, and private sector partners
- Used to evaluate their current disaster logistics readiness, identify areas for targeted improvement, and develop a roadmap to further enhance strengths

How It Works

- FEMA facilitated workshop
- 130 survey questions
- Core Logistics Functional Areas:
 - 1) Logistics Planning
 - 2) Logistics Operations
 - 3) Distribution Management
 - 4) Property Management
 - 5) Organizational Functions




Measured Levels of Logistics Process Maturity

- Static State has not yet developed and/or implemented a viable strategy within the functional area.
- Functional State has implemented informal plans or processes, but Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) have not been defined or adopted.
- Horizontal Integration State has developed and implemented formalized, integrated SOPs across the state emergency management organization.
- **External Collaboration** State has coordinated plans and SOPs with other state, local/tribal, and external partner agencies, organizations, and private vendors.
- Synchronized All local, state, federal, and private partners have fully integrated and synchronized plans, procedures, and operations. All plans and SOPs have been documented and exercised regularly with all participants. State has demonstrated mastery of this capability.

Benefits of LCAT

- Provides a comprehensive snapshot of disaster logistics maturity within a state, and among the state's emergency management partners
- Easy-to-use, forum-friendly application creates environment of group participation and teaming amongst public and private partners
- Provides capability baseline and a tracking mechanism for historical scores, and trend analysis
- A **comprehensive snapshot** of the current state of disaster logistics maturity within a state, and among the state's emergency management partners
- Standardized logistical process controls and best practices, education and training
- Inherently solves logistics problems by identifying areas of focus and providing benchmarks for operational and planning excellence
- A collaborative forum setting that includes both public and private stakeholders from across the emergency management supply chain
- A standard methodology for FEMA/DHS to measure state preparedness levels for the purpose of administering grant funding to increase state readiness













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
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






















LCAT Results Chart









Export Graph

LCAT Manual

http://www.dem.azdema.gov/logistics/lcat.html



LCAT Workshop

- February 20, 2013, 1:00 PM-5:00 PM
- February 21, 2013, 8:00 AM-5:00PM
- PPMR, Allen Readiness Center, Bldg #5260
- RSVP

Matthew.Parks@azdema.gov 602-464-6510





Arizona All-Hazards CONOPS Development

Goal:

Using an All-Hazards approach:

Develop an integrated Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for joint Federal-State response to, and recovery from, a catastrophic incident in the State of Arizona.

Why Develop a CONOPS?

The joint CONOPS purpose is to:

Plan for any catastrophic incident or hazard- regardless of risk or frequency.

Using NIMS and ICS tenets to: Define the roles and responsibilities of Federal and State officials, private sector organizations, and volunteer agencies that support the CONOPS in order to eliminate overlap and duplication of effort through:

- Unity of Effort, Unity of Command
- Common Language, Terminology
- Management by Objective
- Comprehensive Resource Management

CONOPS- Elements

- 1. Situation
 - Purpose
 - Background and Scope
 - Scenario composite based on THIRA
 - Planning Assumptions and Critical Considerations
- 2. Mission
 - Priorities by Core Capability*
- 3. Execution
 - Concept of Operations
 - Organization
 - Roles and Responsibilities
 - Key Tasks
- 4. Coordination
 - Logistics Architecture
 - Communitation

CONOPS Development Process

The CONOPS is a synthesis of the AZ Base Plan and R IX All Hazards Plan

- Focus will be on ensuring joint processes are articulated
- R IX can provide basic draft, with AZ review, input and coordination of Statespecific elements
- Build upon State-wide Ex Planning efforts as an efficiency, and utilize virtual collaboration.

Timeline- FY13

Dec 2012: Form the Planning Team

Jan-Feb 2013: Situation, Assumptions, Information Analysis Brief

March-April 2013: Develop COAs, Decision Brief

April-May 2013: Appendices, and Draft complete

June-July 2013: Stakeholder Review, Edit/Update, and Approval

* Nov 2013: AZ State-wide Exercise

Core Capabilities- Response

Infrastructure Systems

Public Information and Warning

Mass Care Services

Public Health and Medical Services

Mass Search and Rescue Operations

Public and Private Services and Resources

Environmental Response/Health and Safety

Critical Transportation

On-Scene Security and Protection

Fatality Management Services

Broad Impacts

- Electricity
- Water
- Trash and Sewer
- Natural Gas
- Gasoline
- Transportation
- Health and Safety (to include 1st Responders
- Pharmacies
- Pharmaceuticals
- Hospitals /Hospital
 Supplies
- Manufacturing

- Communications
 - Internet
 - Emergency Services
 - Utility Industry
 Communications
 - Public and Private Sector Communications
- Banking
- Grocery Stores
- Retail Stores
- Nitrogen Gaseous Pipeline
- Gas and Chemicals
- Postal and Shipping

Capability Estimates

Capability:	Mass Search and Rescue Operations				
Target:	During the first 72 hours of an incident, conduct typical and atypical Search and Rescue operations for 1,000 residences				
Primary	Columbia Emergency Management Agency (CEMA), SAR Advisory Board				
Step 1 Required Resources	Step 2 Available Resources	Step 3			
Emergency Operations Plan	2010 Emergency Operations Plan				
Evacuation Annex	2007 Evacuation Annex				
Columbia UASI SAR Annex	2011 Columbia UASI SAR Annex				
Columbia UASI (organizational body)	Columbia UASI				
State SAR Advisory Board	State SAR Advisory Board				
3 NIMS Type IV Canine SAR Teams1	1 NIMS Type IV Canine SAR Teams	Major			
1 NIMS Type II Collapse SAR Team2	1 NIMS Type II Collapse SAR Team				
1 Type II US&R Task Force	Most components of Type II US&R Task Force in place	Minor			
1 fixed-wing airborne reconnaissance	1 Type II fixed-wing aircraft				
2 helicopters	2 helicopters (1 of which is available via MOU)				

Capability Estimates

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ADEM

Preparedness Section (PT&E)

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DISCUSSION

Supporting Exercise Events

- February 20th Consequence Analysis Workshop
- March 27th Access and Functional Needs Tabletop
- April TBD Federal Partners Response
- May TBD Patient Movement Workshop
- June TBD
- July TBD
- August TBD
- September Executive TTX, date and location TBD

			Consequences / Cascading Effects of Extended		T	
Functions Private Sectors				Required Capabilities & Resources	Source of Resources	
			(I)Immediate, (N) Near-Term, (L) Long-Term		Primary	Secondary
1.1	Transportation & Infrastructure	1.1.1				
		1.1.2				
		1.1.3				
	1.2 Transportation	1.2.1				
		1.2.2				
	1.3 Postal & Shipping	1.3.1				
		1.3.2				
2.1	Communications	2.1.1				
		2.1.2				
		2.1.3				
	2.2 Telecommunications	2.2.1				
		2.2.2				
	2.3 Information Technology	2.3.1				
		2.3.2		For Official Use Or	nly (FOUO)	138

Closing Comments

- Questions
- Participant Feedback Forms
- Thank-you for attending